INTRODUCTION

The delimitation of maritime boundaries represents one of the most complex and politically sensitive areas of international law. While the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides a foundational framework, its application is often fraught with ambiguity, particularly concerning the treatment of islands. The geographical and legal status of islands can dramatically change maritime boundaries, potentially granting a large maritime spaces rich in resources or severely constricting a neighbor’s access to the sea.

In the Eastern Mediterranean there is a dispute between Türkiye and Greece, centering on a tiny island, Island of Megisti.[1] This island, covering less than 12 km² and home to a few hundred people, is under Greek control and lies just off Türkiye’s southern coast. The main question is whether such a small and distant island should generate a full 200 nautical mile maritime zone, which would effectively put in a difficult position Türkiye’s connection to the high seas and its potential entitlements in the Eastern Mediterranean.

This article analyzes the effects of islands on maritime delimitation, focusing on the Megisti Island case. It will proceed by first establishing the historical, geographical, and economic context of the island. Subsequently, it will outline the relevant maritime zones and the legal distinction between islands and rocks under international law. The core of the analysis will delve into the principles and methods of maritime delimitation as developed by international jurisprudence, with a specific focus on how islands situated on the “wrong side” of a median line have been treated in past cases. Finally, the article will examine  the legal positions of Greece and Türkiye, arguing that an equitable solution necessitates treating Megisti as a special circumstance that warrants limited effect to avoid a manifestly unjust outcome.

I. THE ISLAND’S HISTORY, GEOGRAPHICAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

1. The Island’s History

The important part of the island’s history for this article, in our view, is the Turkish control of the island and how the island came back under Greek control. Turks, took control of the island in 16th century, after the conquest of Rhodos.[2] During the Cretan Wars (1645-1669), the Venetian State and the knight Gremonville, supported by the King of France, sacked the island and blew up the castle.[3] The island has always remained one of the main target of pirates because of its proximity to valuable trade routes.[4] In 1830 Greece recognized as an independent state by Russian Empire, United Kingdom and Kingdom of France with London Protocol and from Ottoman Empire in 1832 but the island stayed in Ottoman Empire.[5]

In the early 20th century, the island’s inhabitants closely followed Greece’s success in the Balkan Wars and sent a delegation, headed by Mich. C. Petridis, submitted a letter to Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos requesting  island’s union with Greece but Venizelos responded cautiously, noting that the island’s geographical position required significant naval protection, which Greece lacked at the time.[6] On 1st March in 1913, 30 armed Creatans and two Castelloriziana arrived to the island, sent by foreign minister, they seized the island, arrested Turkish guard and raised the Greek flag.[7]

On 28 December 1915 The Kingdom of France knowing the hard situation of Greece keeping the island, captured the Megisti for use it as military base.[8] After the end of World War I, France gave the island to the Italy on 1 March 1921.[9]

During the World War II, Megisti was the first place liberated in Dodocenase and used as advanced base to liberate other Dodocenase islands.[10] With the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, Megisti and all the Dodocenase Islands were given to Greece and became a official part of Greece.[11]

2. The Island’s Geography

Megisti Island is located in the Eastern Mediterranean,[12] less than 3 kilometers from the Turkish coast and more than 500 kilometers from the Greek mainland.[13] It has a surface area of under 12 square kilometers and a coastline of approximately 15 kilometers. It is the island furthest from to Greek mainland and closest one to Turkish mainland.[14]The island is mostly mountainous and has only town.[15]

3. The Island’s Economic Activities

The main economic activities of the island are fishing and sponge hunting, also tourism but on a small scale.[16] The locals of Megisti prefer to go to Antalya-Kas to meet their needs more than other Greek cities or islands because of the distance.[17]

II. MARITIME ZONES RELATED TO THE SUBJECT

1. Territorial sea

The territorial sea is the maritime zone over which the sovereign rights of states extend beyond their baselines, and this sovereignty also extends to the airspace over the territorial sea and to the bed and subsoil of the sea.[18] According to UNLCOS Article 3, territorial sea cannot exceed 12 nautical miles.[19]  

The 12-nautical-mile territorial sea is not a general rule; it can only be applied if the geographical and legal conditions allow.[20] Türkiye is not bound by Article 3 of UNCLOS since it is not a party, and even if the 12-mile rule became a rule of customary international law, Türkiye would not have to follow it because it is a persistent objector.[21]

2. Continental Shelf

The continental shelf is a zone that gives states sovereign rights to explore and exploit natural resources on the seabed and beneath it.[22] The continental shelf cannot exceed 200 nautical miles, only if the geography is suitable, this limit can be 350 nautical miles.[23]

3. Exclusive Economic Zone

Exclusive Economic Zone firstly regulated in international law in 1982 UNCLOS. This zone starts from the baselines and cannot exceed 200 nautical miles; this zone gives states sovereign rights to explore, exploit, manage and conserve natural resources (living or not living) superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil.[24]

4. “Islands” and “Rocks” According to The International Law

In colloquial language, there is no difference between “rocks and the islands”. End of the day they’re all lands which are above from the sea level and surrounded by seas on all sides. The difference starts with maritime law and it’s about what sea zones they can have.

The difference between them is not what they have, but what they don’t have.[25] “Rocks” can’t sustain human habitation or economic life.[26] The islands can have their own territorial waters, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, even if they are far from the mainland.[27]  They’re always above water at high tide.[28] Rocks can only have territorial waters, they cannot have EEZ and continental shelf like “islands”. Türkiye is also not bound by Article 121 of UNCLOS since it is not a party, and even if that article became a rule of customary international law, Türkiye would not have to follow it because it is a persistent objector.

III. DELIMITATION OF THE MARITIME ZONES

1. In General

Maritime delimitation constitutes a fundamental aspect of the law of the sea in cases where adjacent states share a common maritime area, as it determines the precise points at which each state’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction commence and terminate. In practice, when two or more states share a maritime boundary, they typically formalize these limits through bilateral or multilateral maritime delimitation agreement.

An examination of international treaties governing maritime boundaries reveals that distinct delimitation principles have been established for territorial seas, the continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones.[29]

a. Territorial Seas

On territorial seas UNCLOS set principles on Article 15. According to Article 15, the territorial sea of two States whose coasts are adjacent or opposite cannot extend beyond a median line drawn according to their baselines.[30] But in the Article 15 UNCLOS made an exception on this “The above provision[31] does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith.”.[32] The special circumstances is important in our topic.

b. Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone

The delimitation of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone have same principle in the UNCLOS.[33] The delimitation of these zones between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be made with a view to arriving at an equitable solution by agreement in accordance with the international law between States.[34]

2. Delimitation Process

UNCLOS does not provide a detailed definition of the equitable solution and methods be employed in maritime delimitation, as the necessity of achieving an equitable solution in light of the specific circumstances of each case requires the use of different methods, thereby deliberately leaving their development to the jurisprudence of courts and tribunals and to state practice.[35] According to the ICJ, the application of equitable principles is essential in maritime delimitation cases in order to achieve an equitable result.[36] Every maritime boundary delimitation case is different from another has also been established by jurisprudence, so according to ICJ main target in the delimitation cases is the find a an equitable solution in the circumstances in each case.[37]

3. Delimitation Methods

a. Equidistance Method

The equidistance method in maritime delimitation involves drawing a boundary line where every point is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines of the opposing or adjacent coasts. However, a delimitation made by this method alone will not produce equitable solutions in every case because of special circumstances. We can see in ICJ’s Judgements this method can’t be used in every case because of special circumstances, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case the court decided:[38]

 “It must next be observed that, in certain geographical circumstances which are quite frequently met with, the equidistance method, despite its known advantages, leads unquestionably to inequity, in the following sense:

(a) The slightest irregularity in a coastline is automatically magnified by the equidistance line as regards the consequences for the delimitation of the continental shelf. Thus it has been seen in the case of concave or convex coastlines that if the equidistance method is employed, then the greater the irregularity and the further from the coastline the area to be delimited, the more unreasonable are the results produced. So great an exaggeration of the consequences of a natural geographical feature must be remedied or compensated for as far as possible, being of itself creative of inequity…”[39]                  

 “For these reasons, by eleven votes to six,finds that, in each case,  

(A) the use of the equidistance method of delimitation not being obligatory as between the Parties; and

(B) there being no other single method of delimitation the use of which is in all circumstances  obligatory…”.[40]

And in the Tunisia/Libya Case:

“The Court held in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases which also concerned adjacent States, that the equidistance method of delimitation of the continental shelf is not prescribed by a mandatory rule of customary law (I. C.J. Reports 1969, p. 46, para. 83 ; p. 53, para. 101). On the other hand, it emphasized the merits of this rule in cases in which its application leads to an equitable solution.”[41]

As we can see from the ICJ cases, the equidistance method is not a mandatory rule for delimitation. In special circumstances the application of this method may even cause serious inequity, so each case should be considered in its own circumstances.

A.   Three Stage Maritime Delimitation Methodology

The three-stage delimitation methodology has become the most widely used approach in the modern era, particularly after the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, in order to secure an equitable solution. In the first stage, a provisional equidistance/median line is drawn from the nearest points on the coasts of the States. In the second stage, this line is subsequently adjusted in light of the relevant circumstances to achieve an equitable result. In the third stage, the adjusted line is examined to determine whether any gross disproportionality exists between the ratio of coastal lengths and the ratio of allocated maritime areas, and, if so, the line is further modified to remove such disproportionality.[42] 

1.     Delimitation Principles

Based on the jurisprudence of the ICJ, it may be argued that in delimitation cases, the Court relies on a set of delimitation principles from which it selects those deemed appropriate to the circumstances of the case.[43]  

A.   Land Dominates the Sea Principle

The ‘Land dominates the sea’ principle holds that a State’s maritime zones derive from its coastline. This principle is closely linked to the concept of the continental shelf, which represents the natural prolongation of a State’s mainland into the sea.

B.    Not Considering Landmass

Bigger landmass doesn’t mean bigger naturel prolongation so does not mean bigger continental shelf. In the delimination landmass is not an factor like lenght of the coastline.

 “The capacity to engender continental shelf rights derives not from the landmass, but from sovereignty over the landmass.”[44]

C.   Coastal Geography Dominates Maritime Delimitation

Existence of maritime zones is about having a coast before anything else, so the prerequisite for having sovereign rights in the sea is having a coast.[45] According to this, in maritime delimitation, geographical circumstances have priority over other circumstances.[46] ICJ adressed this in cases.

In the Libya v Malta Case:

“The nature of equity is nowhere more evident than in these well established principles. In interpreting them, it must be borne in mind that the geography which is not to be refashioned means those aspects of a geographical situation most germane to the legal institution of the continental shelf ; and it is “the coast of each of the Parties”, which

“constitutes the starting line from which one has to set out in order to ascertain how far the submarine areas appertaining to each of them extend in a seaward direction, as well as in relation to neighboring States situated either in an adjacent or opposite position” (I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 61, para. 74).”[47]

In the America v Canada Case:

 “In either case, delimitation is to be effected by the application of  equitable criteria and by the use of practical methods capable of ensuring, with regard to the geographic configuration of the area and other relevant circumstances, an equitable result.”[48]

D.   The Non‑Refashioning of Geography Principle

Accordingly, an equitable delimitation must primarily be shaped by geographical factors, particularly the length of coastlines, and non-geographical factors should not have such an influence as to substantially alter the effect of geography; otherwise, the method cannot be regarded as equitable — a principle known in jurisprudence as the ‘non-refashioning of geography’ rule.[49]

In the North Sea Continental Shelf case, under the method to be applied, one State having less maritime area than another, despite nature having granted them equal coastal lengths, would be contrary to the ‘non-refashioning of geography’ principle.[50] Otherwise, applying the method would upset the equality conferred by nature, effectively refashioning geography.[51]

“But in the present case there are three States whose North Sea coastlines are in fact comparable in length and which, therefore, have been given broadly equal treatment by nature except that the configuration of one of the coastlines would, if the equidistance method is used, deny to one of these States treatment equal or comparable to that given the other two.”[52]

E.    Proportionality Principle

Proportionality has two different effects on maritime delimitation; first, it can be considered as a special circumstance, secondly, it can be considered as a factor of equity, in which case, at the end of delimitation, the given coastline of States and the given maritime zones can be tested in terms of proportionality.[53]

a.     Proportionality

The principle of proportionality in maritime delimitation ensures a reasonable ratio between the maritime areas allocated to each State and their respective coastline lengths.[54] It is not a delimitation method on its own, but serves as an equity check at the final stage to determine whether the previously drawn boundary needs adjustment.[55] It will be understood that this principle is quite logical, given that the mainland and coasts have supremacy in delimitation.[56]

b.     Using Proportionality Test

Proportionality test (as we said) will be used in the last step of the delimitation. As the Çağlar and Sümer said:

“And thirdly, general direction of the coast will be taken into account. Finally, proportionality test is applied by the Courts and tribunals. In Tunisia v. Libya, Libya v. Malta, Guinea v. Guinea Bissau, Eritrea v. Yemen, Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana v. Surinam and Romania v. Ukraine cases, proportionality test was applied as a test of the equitableness of the suggested delimitation lines. In other instances, proportionality was used as a factor for shifting provisionally drawn equidistance Lines.”[57]

In the final stage, the Court or Tribunal subjects the proposed delimitation line to a proportionality test. This involves reviewing whether, in light of the respective coastal lengths and the line drawn, the result is equitable

F.    Non-Encroachment / Cut-off Principle

The principles of cut-off and non-encroachment aim to prevent the maritime areas adjacent to a State from being allocated to another.[58] Their application depends on the basis of entitlement adopted in delimitation: under natural prolongation, each State’s continental shelf should extend without interruption, while under the distance method, maritime areas close to a State’s coast should belong to it and the general seaward projection of its coast should not be cut off.[59] These principles are not absolute rules, but general guidelines that must be balanced with proportionality and other relevant circumstances to achieve an equitable result.[60]

In the North Sea Continenal Shelf Case:

“…for the reasons given in paragraphs 43 and 44, the continental shelf of any State must be the natural prolongation of its land territory and must not encroach upon what is the natural prolongation of the territory of another State.”[61]

In the Gulf of Maine Delimitation Case:

“…the equal division of the areas of overlap of the maritime and submarine zones appertaining to the respective coasts of neighbouring States ; the criterion that, whenever possible, the seaward extension of a State’s coast should not encroach upon areas that are too close to the coast of another State ; the criterion of preventing, as far as possible, any cut-off of the seaward projection of the coast or of part of the coast of either of the States concerned ; and the criterion whereby, in certain circumstances, the appropriate consequences may be drawn from any inequalities in the extent of the coasts of two States into the same area of delimitation.”[62]

In the delimitation of maritime zones, particularly in areas where States cannot achieve their maximum entitlements, or in special circumstances such as when a State’s island lies on the ‘wrong side’ and very close to another State’s coast (as in our case), the mere mechanical application of international law rules may lead to inequitable results, especially by blocking a State’s access to the high seas.

     I.         ISLANDS EFFECTS TO THE DELIMITATION

As previously discussed, every delimitation dispute is special in itself, islands are one of the circumstances in the special circumstances.  Sometimes an island or islands can be very close to the State’s mainland and it could be a problem as to how to determine baselines for delimitation and in some situations (like in our topic) an island or islands of a State may be located in close proximity to the mainland of the opposing State in the dispute.[63]

There is no doubt that every island has its own territorial waters and has EEZ and continental shelf, if it meets the necessary conditions, the main problem of the islands, will they affect delimitation like the mainland, or will they have different effects on delimitation according to the circumstances?[64] As we can see in the interstate practice and in the international judicial decisions, the effect of islands on the delimitation changes according to the feature of zones and the feature of islands.[65]

Islands can be classified in four different positions according to median line and their effect on delimitation: Those closer to their own State’s mainland (correct side of the median line), those placed on or near the median line, those closer to coast of other State’s mainland (wrong side of the median line), and last situation is where islands are overseas.[66]

1.     Islands on the Correct Side of the Median Line

If an island or islands are close to the main state, the state may use them when delimiting its territorial sea with another state.[67]  Even the State can use their island or islands as a base point when delimiting EEZ and continental shelf if the islands meet the requirements to have EEZ and continental shelf.[68] In inter-State practice and international judicial decisions, there are different approaches regarding the use of islands on the correct side of the median line.

A.   Limited Effect or Not Using the Island/Island’s

If a State’s island is very small, or if more significant geographical features are present, the effect of the island on maritime delimitation may be limited, and there are even examples of States choosing not to use such islands in delimitation.[69] For instance, in the Iran-Qatar agreement, although there are numerous small islands between the two States, they were not taken into account in the delimitation, and only the median line was used.[70]  

B.      True Effect

In certain cases, States may give full effect to islands by considering them as integral parts of the mainland and designating them as base points for drawing straight baselines; this situation occurs to them because these islands are so close to the mainland and giving them full effect will not make serious changes to the median line. There are examples where States have recognized islands as one of the base points for the median line, even if they do not use straight baselines.[71]

We can see in some cases even if delimitation states have adjacent coasts islands can have true effect on the delimitation. In the Mexica-United States of America agreement, both countries have islands on offshore and they used them for balancing the median line.

2.     Islands Lie on or Near of the Median Line

In some cases, islands lie on or near the median line. Granting them full effect may significantly alter the course of the median line, allowing the State controls the island to obtain disproportionately large maritime zones.[72] Such a result mostly contradicts the ICJ’s principle that “geography cannot be reshaped.”. According to this principle, the presence of an island cannot fundamentally limit a State’s geographical entitlement; for instance, it cannot deprive a State of its continental shelf, which derives from natural prolongation, nor can it artificially confine a State’s rights to its coasts.

Even though granting full effect to islands often risks creating inequitable solutions, there are cases and agreements (such as Finland-USSR 1965, Denmark-Sweden 1984, Venezuela-USA 1978, Venezuela-Netherlands 1978, and Netherlands-France) where islands were granted full effect, yet the other State still secured a substantial portion of the maritime area, preventing actual inequity. In practice, delimitations are more commonly achieved by giving islands only limited effect, usually by surrounding them with a restricted maritime zone.[73]

In the Nicaragua-Colombia case, although Colombia’s islands Quitasueño and Serrana lie near the equidistance line, Quitasueño was deemed uninhabitable for human and economic activity and thus could not affect the EEZ or continental shelf, while due to Serrana’s small size the ICJ held that giving full effect to these islands would be inequitable, granting them only a 12‑nautical‑mile territorial sea and adjusting the median line accordingly, without considering either island as a base point.[74]

In the 1971 Italy-Tunisia Agreement, the maritime delimitation between the Tunisian mainland and Italy’s Sicily was established along an equidistance line, four Italian islands located near this line were granted only partial effect using by surrounding them in order to avoid inequitable results.[75]

In the 1973 Canada–Denmark (Greenland) Agreement, which concerned a narrow maritime area, the delimitation method gave effect to islands close to the coast, yet Denmark’s Carey Islands, located near the equidistance line, appear to have been entirely ignored.[76]

If there is islands lie on or near of the median line size of those islands, the effects on the equidistance line and the other characteristics considered to giving those islands effects.[77] In some cases, when we give full effect to those islands, if the other state still have significant sea size or if it doesnt significantly restrict other states sea size full effects were given.[78] Each case has different circumstances, so islands have been given different effects. The principle of equity has always been a key consideration.

In the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) case, the Court dealt with the impact of the Kerkennah Islands on the delimitation of the continental shelf. The ICJ recalled that in State practice, islands situated close to the coast were sometimes given only partial effect in order to avoid inequitable results. For this purpose, the Court referred to the “half-effect” or “half-angle” technique, which consists of drawing one line giving the island full effect, another disregarding the island entirely, and then adopting a compromise line between the two.

Applying this method, the ICJ decided to give the Kerkennah Islands a half-effect, taking into account their geographical position. Consequently, the delimitation line of the Gulf of Gabes was drawn parallel to a bisector line between the Tunisian coast and the coast of the Kerkennah Islands, reflecting a reduced but not negligible effect of the islands on the delimitation. This judgment established that islands located very close to the mainland may be granted only partial effect in order to achieve an equitable solution in maritime delimitation.[79]

3.     Islands on the Wrong Side of the Median Line

In international practice, islands located on the “wrong side” in narrow seas are often given only partial effect, since granting them full effect would unduly restrict the maritime areas of the opposite State and lead to inequitable results.[80]

A.   Bangladesh v Myanmar

In the Bangladesh-Myanmar case, St. Martin Island, which belongs to Bangladesh, is on the wrong side of the median line and its proximity to the Myanmar mainland. [81] In the delimitation of the territorial seas, the issue of whether should St. Martin have an effect or not was debated. Bangladesh argued that St. Martin’s Island should be given full effect in the delimitation of the territorial sea, while Myanmar objected on the grounds that the island lies on the “wrong side” of the median line; however, the Tribunal granted the island full effect due to its permanent population and economic activities.[82] The Tribunal views that had the equidistance line been adjusted closer to St. Martin’s Island, effectively giving the island less influence in the territorial sea delimitation, Myanmar’s sovereign rights over the EEZ and continental shelf would have outweighed the territorial sea rights of St. Martin, creating a disproportionate allocation of maritime entitlements.[83]

In the delimitation of the territorial sea and continental shelf, the Tribunal did not treat the island’s location on the “wrong side” as a relevant factor and did not adjust the area; however, since the island was granted only a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, the boundary initially followed the equidistance line between the island and Myanmar, continued by partially enclosing the coasts on Myanmar’s side of the island, and then extended along the equidistance line up to the point where third States’ rights would be affected, marking the end of the island’s influence.[84]

This illustrates that islands near the opposing coast can be limited to territorial waters. Granting full EEZ or continental shelf rights in such cases could disproportionately restrict the maritime entitlements of the nearby mainland. Therefore, in maritime delimitation, proximity to the opposing coast is a critical factor, and islands may be assigned only limited effect to ensure an equitable allocation of maritime zones.

B.    Australia v Papua New Guinea

In the 1978 Australia–Papua New Guinea Treaty, Boigu and Sabai islands lie only 3–4 miles from the PNG coast, but when the simplified equidistance line was drawn on PNG’s side, Australia’s 15 islands were not granted any EEZ beyond their territorial waters.[85] Only a protected zone was established to preserve traditional fishing rights.[86]

   II.         Dispute on the Megisti Island’s Effects in the Delimitation

1.     Greek Argument of the Dispute

A.   Legal Basis

Greece maintains that Island of Megisti (Kastellorizo) is an island under the Article 121 and it can enjoy sovereign rights like coastal territory, including; 12 nautical miles territorial sea and up to 200 nautical miles of continental shelf and EEZ.[87] Greek side rejects that application of Article 121(3), arguing that inhabited and sustains economic life.

B.    Official Position of Greece

The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs states: ‘According to customary international law, which is also codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Greece has the right to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles.’[88] According to Greek officials, the relevant UNCLOS provisions have either already become, or were from the outset, part of customary international law.

Also Greece side contends all of the islands even if they lie on the wrong side of the median line and even if they are 2 km away from the opposite state should have full effect in the delimitation, and should enjoy all of the sovereign rights of Article 121(2).[89]

C.   Strategic and Geopolitical Significance to Greece

The Island of Megisti (Kastellorizo), situated merely 2 km off Türkiye’s southern coast, is the closest Greek island to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Recent hydrocarbon explorations have identified significant oil and gas reserves in the region, underscoring its strategic importance.[90] Furthermore, Greece is closely linked to the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC), which Türkiye and the TRNC do not recognize as a state.

The GASC has established an EEZ and Continental Shelf delimitation agreement with Israel, Lebanon and Egypt which Türkiye has objected to on the grounds that it disregards both Türkiye’s and TRNC’s presence in the region.[91] The strategic significance of Megisti is particularly pronounced: if the island is granted full effect and allocated 200 nautical miles of EEZ and Continental Shelf, Türkiye’s access to the Eastern Mediterranean could be effectively blocked by the Greek administration.

2.     Turkish Argument of the Dispute

A.   Proximity of Megisti (Kastellorizo) to the Turkish Coast

The Turkish side argues that islands like Megisti cannot have full effect in maritime delimitation due to their proximity to the Turkish coast, especially since Megisti is only 2 km away. Türkiye maintains that such islands should be considered as “special circumstances” and, therefore, should have only half effect in the delimitation.

B.    Persistent Objector Position

Even if the 12 nautical miles territorial sea rule and Article 121 of UNCLOS, which regulates the rights of islands to have territorial sea, continental shelf, and EEZ similar to the mainland, are considered customary international law, these rules cannot be applied to Türkiye due to Türkiye’s persistent objector position[92] since 1982.

C.   Türkiye’s Casus Belli

After the 1982 UNCLOS granted States the right to expand their territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles, Greece declared that it had the right to extend its territorial sea. Expanding Greece’s territorial waters to 12 nautical miles would place the majority of the Aegean Sea under Greek sovereignty. Türkiye responded that if Greece declared 12 nautical miles of territorial sea in the Aegean Sea, it would constitute a casus belli for Türkiye.[93]

D.    Islands on the “Wrong Side” of the Median Line

Türkiye also contends that Megisti lies on the “wrong side” of the median line between Türkiye and Greece. Türkiye bases its position on ICJ decisions and interstate practices across the world. As explained in the previous parts, granting full effect and full rights to islands under Article 121 of UNCLOS often creates inequitable solutions in delimitation. There are also examples where islands lying on the wrong side of the median line were granted full effect. However, in those examples, delimitations mostly involved large maritime zones, or even if the islands lay on the wrong side of the median line, they were located far from the mainland of the other State.[94]

E.    Principles Should Be Considered According Türkiye

a.     Proportionality

Türkiye argues that granting full effect to Megisti would be inconsistent with the principle of proportionality. The island has only about 19 km of coastline compared to Türkiye’s 2,200 km, and it covers merely 12 square kilometers. Yet giving it full effect would allow such a small feature to generate a disproportionately large impact on Türkiye’s EEZ and Continental Shelf, contrary to the proportionality principle and the pursuit of an equitable solution.

b.     The Non-Refashioning of Geography Principle

Turkish doctrine argues that a delimitation line drawn not between the Greek and Turkish mainlands but between Türkiye’s coast and Greece’s islands lying in the eastern Mediterranean, including the island of Megisti, which is about 570–580 km from the Greek mainland, would be contrary to the principle against non refashioning geography.[95] As previously noted in ICJ jurisprudence,[96] even though nature has has treated the parties almost equally, allowing a tiny island to generate 200 nautical miles of EEZ and continental shelf in the eastern Mediterranean thereby blocking most of Türkiye’s maritime zones would amount to judicial refashioning of geography.

c.     Non Cut Off – Non-Encroachment opposant Principle

This principle is highly important when delimitating enclosed and semi-enclosed seas.[97] Due to the nature of these seas, most adjacent states cannot have their maximum maritime zones granted under international law.[98] Granting maritime zones beyond territorial waters to Greece’s islands lying in the Eastern Mediterranean, including the island of Megisti, in a delimitation between Türkiye and Greece would be contrary to this principle and would potentially result in a blockade of Antalya.[99]

CONCLUSION

The examination of international law, state practice, and the jurisprudence of international courts highlights the significance of Megisti Island’s geographical reality in determining its legal effect in maritime delimitation. The principle that “land dominates the sea” is closely linked to the mainland coast, from which maritime entitlements naturally emanate. Allowing a 12 km² island, located close to another state’s coast and far from its sovereign mainland, to generate an extensive maritime zone raises concerns about equity and geographic distortion.

International jurisprudence further demonstrates that islands situated on the “wrong side” of the median line are often accorded reduced or no effect in order to avoid cut-off and encroachment of the opposite state’s maritime projection. Principles such as proportionality and the equitable consideration of geographical circumstances suggest that granting Megisti full effect would create significant imbalance, given the contrast between Türkiye’s long mainland coastline and the island’s limited maritime presence.

In addition, Türkiye’s persistent objections to the application of certain UNCLOS provisions in semi-enclosed seas reflect its consistent legal stance on such issues. Against this background, it may be argued that Megisti constitutes a special circumstance that requires careful limitation in any delimitation process between Greece and Türkiye.

[1] The other name of island is Kastellorizo

[2] Şimşek Fatma, ‘Orta Çağ’dan Osmanlı Dönemine Doğu Akdeniz’de Rekabet Kıskacında Bir Ada: Meis’ (2022) 37 [2] Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi 657,659.

[3] Ibid 673

[4] Ibid 677

[5] Our Kastellorizo-History, </www.kastellorizo.gov.gr/en/history/>, accessed 15 August 2025.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Treaty of Peace with Italy (signed 10 February 1947, entered into force 15 September 1947) 49 UNTS Article 14

[12] The Eastern Mediterranean is also known as the Levantine Sea.

[13] Köchler H, Kastellorizo the Geopolitics of Maritime Boundaries and the Dysfunctionality of the Law of the Sea Hans Köchler(International Progress Organization 2021), 25.

[14] https://www.wikiderya.org/wiki/meis-kastellorizo 18 august 2025

[15] https://broadreachmaritime.org/adopt-an-island/dodecanese-islands-southern-sporades/kastellorizo/ 18 august 2025

[16] https://www.britannica.com/place/Kastellorizo-island-Greece, 18 august 2025; https://broadreachmaritime.org/adopt-an-island/dodecanese-islands-southern-sporades/kastellorizo/, 18 august 2025.

[17] https://www.wikiderya.org/wiki/meis-kastellorizo, 18 august 2025.

[18] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397, art 2.

[19] UNCLOS, art 3

[20] Akkutay BL, ‘Ege Karasuları Sınırlandırmasında Adaların Etkisinin Uluslararası Hukuk Bakımından Değerlendirilmesi’ (2018) 33 Türkiye Adalet Akademisi Dergisi 193, 202.

[21] Ibid.

[22] UNCLOS, art 76.

[23] Ibid.

[24] UNLOCS, art 55, 57.

[25] UNCLOS, art 121/3

[26] Ibid.

[27] UNCLOS, art 121/2

[28] UNCLOS, art 121/1

[29] Yücel Acer ve İbrahim Kaya, Uluslararası Hukuk Temel Ders Kitabı (İngilizce Özetli) (Seçkin Yayıncılık 2022) 229.

[30] UNLOCS, art 15.

[31] Above provision is the principle we explained in the first sentence.

[32] UNLOCS, art 15/last sentence.

[33] For the relevant provisions, see UNCLOS art 74, 83.

[34]UNLOCST, art 74, 83

[35] SALİ ÖM, ‘Deni̇z Yetki̇ Alanlarının Sınırlandırılmasında Doğu Akdeni̇z Adalari’ (2022) 5 Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Diplomasi 38, 42.

[36] Erciyes Ç and Sümer M, ‘Maritime Boundary Delimitation Process’ (2019) 2 DEHUKAM Journal of the Sea and Maritime Law 415, 422.

[37] Ibid, 423

[38] Górka M, ‘Equitable Principles in the Delimitation of the Aegean Continental Shelf’ (2022) 12 Polish Review of International and European Law 199, 211

[39] North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) ICJ Rep 1969, para. 89.

[40] Ibid, para 101

[41] Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) ICJ Rep 1982, para. 109.

[42] Lathrop CG, ‘The Provisional Equidistance Line’ [2018] Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Case Law 200, 200-201 (This source applies to the entire paragraph)

[43] Acer Y and others, Doğu Akdeniz Deniz Yetki Alanlarında Hukuk ve Siyaset (Sertaç Hami Başeren ed, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi 2013) ,310.

[44] Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) (Judgment) [1985] ICJ Rep 13, para. 49.

[45] Açıkgönül YE, Deniz Yetki Alanlarının Hakça İlkeler Çerçevesinde Sınırlandırılması (Legal 2012) 106

[46] Ibid.

[47]  Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) (Judgment) [1985] ICJ Rep 13, para. 47

[48] Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America) (Judgment) [1984] ICJ Rep 246, para. 112 (2).

[49] Açıkgönül (n 45) 110

[50] Ibid; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) ICJ Rep 1969, para. 91.

[51] Açıkgönül (n 45) 110

[52]  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) ICJ Rep 1969, para. 91.

[53] Açıkgönül (n 45) 115

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Erciyes and Sümer (n 36) 430-431

[58] Açıkgönül (n 45) 126.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid, 127.

[61] North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) ICJ Rep 1969, para. 85.

[62] Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America) (Judgment) [1984] ICJ Rep 246, para. 157

[63] Murphy SD, ‘Effects of Islands on Maritime Boundary Delimitation’ [2017] International Law Relating to Islands 221, 221.

[64] ACER Y, ‘Deniz Alanlarının Sınırlandırılmasında Adaların Rolü ve Devletlerarası Uygulama’ (2008) 4 Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika 1, 2-3.

[65] Ibid, 2-3.

[66] Ibid, 3.

[67] Murphy (n 40) 233

[68] Ibid.

[69] Acer (n 64) 4

[70] Ibid, 5.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid, p. 9.

[73] Ibid, p. 9-10.

[74] Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Colombia) ICJ, Judgment, 19 November 2012, para 218.

[75] Acer (n 64) 11

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid, 12.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Maritime Delimitation in the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libya) ICJ, Judgment, 24 February 1982, para 129

[80] Acer (n 64)16.

[81] Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar) (Judgment) [2012] ITLOS Rep 4.

[82] Burger ME, ‘Adaların Deniz Alanlarının Sınırlandırılmasındaki Rolü: Uluslararası Adalet Divanı ve Uluslararası Deniz Hukuku Mahkemesi Pratiği’ (2019) 2 DEHUKAMDER 21, 40.

[83] Leo Bernard, ‘The Effect of Islands in Maritime Delimitation’ (19 November 2012) Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore, 3 <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/LeoBernard-Effect-of-Islands-in-Maritime-Delimitation-19-Nov-2012.pdf> accessed 2 September 2025.

[84] Burger, (n 82), 40-41

[85] Acer (n 64) 15

[86] Ibid.

[87] UNLCOS Art. 121(2)

[88] Efthymios Papastavridis, The Greek‑Turkish Maritime Disputes: An International Law Perspective (ELIAMEP Policy Paper, 9 July 2020) <https://www.eliamep.gr/en/oi-ellinotourkikes-diafores-sto-thalassio-choro-apo-tin-optiki-tou-diethnous-dikaiou/>  accessed 7 September 2025

[89] Ibid.

[90] Gertik M, ‘THE ONGOING MARITIME DISPUTES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SEA AND THE ROLE OF MEIS ISLAND’ (2025) 29 Law and Justice Review 25, p. 27

[91] Ibid, 30.

[92] DEHUKAM, ‘Taraf Olunmayan’, DEHUKAM (Ankara Üniversitesi Deniz Hukuku Ulusal Araştırma Merkezi) ‹https://www.dehukam.org/uluslararasi-sozlesmeler/taraf-olunmayan/› accessed 7 September 2025

[93] Çelikkol AO and Karabel S, ‘Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkileri ve Denizden Kaynaklanan Uluslararası Sorunlar’ (2017) 9 Bilge Strateji 13, p. 18.

[94] Acer (n 64) 13-16.

[95] Açıkgönül (n 45 ) 113-114.

[96] See page 9 of this paper.

[97] Açıkgönül (n 45) 129.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid 130.